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Sergei Lunev argues that Russia should pursue improved political and economic relations with India,
despite the many setbacks in the partnership. This is the second of two posts examining parallels and bilateral
relations between India and Russia. Click here for a post titled ‘Globalisation: Many Indias, many Russias’. 
Many reasons underpin the successful development of India-Russia relations, but it would be imprudent to set  all
hopes upon these. Concrete, consistent initiatives and changing Russian and Indian elites’ approaches towards the
partnership are essential, otherwise the stagnation of bilateral ties might worsen to  degradation. At present, the
relationship is predicated on cooperation in the defence and aerospace sectors, but the potential of these are
insufficient to secure long-term, positive ties.
India has already joined the group of world powers and tuned into a special sub-system of international relations.
Together with the United States and China, it is the most likely candidate for the status of a global centre of
influence, and the future of the world will probably depend on the development of relations within the US-China-India
triangle. Russia, the European Union, and Japan have an opportunity to be part of a new pattern, but much will
depend on their political will and dynamics of economic development. Russia should attach special significance to
the development of relations with India due to its place in the world political and economic system.
The strategic partnership between the two countries has been natural and objective. Russian and Indian national
interests coincide, or at least do not contradict each other. Geopolitical considerations predetermine the need to
strengthen mutual ties. The famous Arthashastra treatise, allegedly written by Kautilya, noted that “your immediate
neighbour is your enemy and your neighbour’s neighbour…is a friend.” The proximity of Russian and Indian
positions on global issues is not accidental. An analysis of voting at the UN General Assembly on a broad range of
world politics issues shows that Russia and India vote similarly, while on international security themes they vote
unanimously. The two countries reject a unipolar world. Russia and India are also interested in easing the conflict
potential in relations between the North and the South.
Political processes in South Asia obviously resemble the post-Soviet situation: the presence of a state that is
superior to others by economic, political, intellectual, and military strategic indicators; common history of the
countries in the region; cultural and civilisational similarities across countries; smaller countries striving to strengthen
their geopolitical positions with the assistance of states located beyond their region; and disruption of economic ties
within a hitherto consolidated economic complex. In its regional context, India’s situation is amazingly similar to
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Russia’s. This geopolitical similarity determines similar approaches to Commonwealth of Independent States
problems for Russia and to South Asia relations for India.
Moreover, Russian and Indian foreign economic goals are also similar. The two countries strive for integration into
the world economy and increasing their competitiveness while protecting domestic production. The common
objectives of Russia and India stem not only from their similar place in the world economy, but also from the size of
their territories and populations. By quantitative indicators, the roles of the two countries in the world economy are
similar. But from a qualitative perspective, Russia and India belong to different groups of countries. While Russia still
has the opportunity to go a high-tech path, India is unlikely to enter the post-industrial phase of development in the
short term.
These differences could lead to a positive and promising result: the consolidation of Russian high-tech and mining
potency with India’s industrial opportunities. The prospect for combining Russian research with Indian engineering
(which is already taking place in the defence sector) and inexpensive Chinese labour seems attractive. The end
product would go to a huge sales market given that the two Asian giants focus on their domestic markets and post
the highest long-term growth rates in the world. However, if realised, such a scenario would lead to a paradox:
Russian reforms with a view to a phased rapprochement with the West would be implemented on the basis of
developing political and economic ties with the East.
Despite all the reasons in favour of improved Russia-India ties, the bilateral relationship has endured many setbacks
and faces multiple challenges. For one, the psychological perception of the partner by the elites is negative. The
‘third’ wave of immigration from India to North America and Europe created a powerful expatriate community that
occupies a privileged position in both its original and new homelands. This diaspora has led to closer ties between
India and the United States, dismantling a five-decade consensus in foreign policy.
The consequences of this shifting dynamic in India are exacerbated by the fact that Russia has illusions that India is
thankful for economic, political, and military support rendered by the USSR. This is not true because India has long
forgotten those earlier ties, and Russia does not remind India about them. In the post-bipolar period, Russia has
taken no action to improve its image abroad. The West continues to form Russia’s image on the global stage—and
that image is inherently biased.
India, and Asia in general, is exposed to the West’s projection of Russia, which explains why the overall attitude
towards Russia (in places like India) is taking a turn for the worse. The defamation of Russia is not only politically
dangerous, but it also limits Russia’s ability to compete economically with the West. If the Indian mass media
lobbied Russian interests, it would be more difficult to prevent Russian companies from participating in the
modernisation of enterprises built by the Soviet Union in India.
Owing to the scaling down of Russian propaganda in India, opinion polls show that Indian attitudes towards Russia
are worsening, and are now on par with how Indians feel about the United States. Only 36 per cent of Indians polled
said Russia had a positive influence on the global situation, whereas in Russia, 47 per cent of respondents gave a
positive opinion of India’s role.
As for the Russian elite, it continues to believe in a Eurocentrist “ideal model”, feels an inferiority complex with
respect to Europe, and has a traditionally pessimistic view of its own country. A certain disappointment with the
West’s policy is manifested in growing scepticism towards the United States, but not towards Western Europe. The
largely pro-Western approaches of Russia’s elite are a major obstacle to the strengthening of the Asian vector in the
country’s foreign policy—indeed Moscow’s continuing policy of approaching India as a country of secondary
importance is a setback for the partnership.
It doesn’t help that Russian and Indian businesses have not developed normal relations either. Indian industrialists
who used to deal with Soviet bodies have no solid ties with the private sector that emerged in Russia, and make
justified complaints about corruption and the mafia in Russia. On the whole, Indian business is not keen to seek
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rapprochement with Russia. For their part, Russian businessmen are not particularly welcome in South Asia and
also complain of encountering bribe-taking and fraud. Russian entrepreneurs also have a poor knowledge of Indian
reality, particularly state-run companies that remain over-bureaucratised and inflexible.
Meanwhile, Indian courts discourage Russian investment by defending compatriots in practically all cases. Russia
also points out that India places considerable restrictions on its exports to India (on several occasions in the past,
India accounted for the largest number of anti-dumping probes against Russian metallurgical companies, along with
two other countries).
Rebuilding the previous level of political trust between Moscow and New Delhi must occur in the context of the new
economic situation in the two countries. The governments have far fewer opportunities to influence the dynamics of
foreign economic relations, which are focused in both countries on the United States, Europe, and East Asia. The
situation may change if top Russian and Indian politicians begin to actively lobby Russian economic interests in
India (including the interests of private companies) and vice versa. In the absence of such initiatives, a renewed
bilateral relationship seems unlikely.
Sergei Lunev is a Professor at the Higher School of Economics at Moscow State Institute of International Relations
under the Foreign Ministry and National Research University.
This post comprises excerpts from an article that first appeared in Russia and India, the magazine of Russia’s
Business Council for Cooperation with India, on the occasion of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum
2013. 
Copyright © 2016 London School of Economics
3/3
